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LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS - THEIR
PROTECTION FROM TAXES AND
CREDITORS
MYRON L. GORDON
The bulk of life insurance proceeds are payable to persons whom the
deceased is primarily interested in giving greatest security and protec-
tion. It would seriously thwart the intentions of most estate owners
if the natural objects of their bounty suffered because the life insurance
proceeds were diminished by taxes or creditors' claims.
It is only through an understanding of the various methods by
which life insurance proceeds can be protected that the death-conscious
estate owner will assure to his beneficiaries the maximum returns from
an insurance program. Life insurance is- favorably treated under our
laws with reference to both taxes and creditors, but there are pitfalls
along the way which constitute treacherous traps for the unwary. This
article is designed to point out some of the more important traps which
can be avoided. The article is concerned only with the proceeds of pol-
icies paid by reason of the death of the insured, and, therefore, it will
be directed chiefly to problems which confront the insured in arranging,
executing, and amending his life insurance program.
A. INCOME TAXES ON INSURANCE PROCEEDS.
Congress has recognized that life insurance has a great social value
and has encouraged its use in many ways, not the least important of
which is favorable treatment under the Federal income tax laws. The
proceeds themselves are excluded from the gross income of the recip-
ient whether he is an individual, partnership or corporation.1 This is
true even if the insured's estate is the beneficiary.
If the beneficiary is a corporation, the proceeds are not income to
the corporation at the time of their receipt2 but are taxable income to
the shareholders when distribution is made to the shareholders as divi-
dends.&3 The statutory exemption for insurance proceeds must be pre-
cisely met, or else the general definition of gross income contained in
Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code is broad enough to make
the proceeds taxable. That this is a real threat is apparent from the
Supreme Court's observation that there is a presumption in favor of
taxation rather than exemption. 4
1 I.R.C. 22 (b) (1); Regs. 111, Sec. 29.22 (b) (1) -1.
2 An interesting tax problem is raised by their receipt: will the proceeds so
influence the corporation's surplus as to create a problem of unreasonably
accumulated surplus under I.R.C. 102?
3 Golden v. Comm., 113 F. (2d) 590(C.C.A. 3rd, 1940); Cummings v. Comm.,
73 F.(2d)447(C.C.A. 1st, 1934).
4 U.S. v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 85 (1940).
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It is now well established that through appropriate use of the set-
tlement options, payments to the beneficiary by the insurance company
may include items of both principal and interest, and yet the entire
amount so paid is not subject to income tax. The Treasury fought
vigorously to sustain its view that so much of a payment under a set-
tlement option selected by the beneficiary as could be regarded as inter-
est should be taxable income to the recipient. However, the courts have
consistently held that installment payments which include both principal
and interest are not included in gross income regardless whether the
insured or the beneficiary selected the mode of payment.5
If the proceeds are payable under a settlement option which pro-
vides for the payment of interest only, such payments are expressly
taxable.6 There may be some difficulty in recognizing just when a pay-
ment constitutes "interest." One insurance company agreed to pay a
yearly "bonus" to a beneficiary of a policy in return for the right to
use the principal for investment purposes. The court quite properly
held this to be "interest" and taxable.7 Another exceptibn concerns in-
stallment payments to a divorced or legally separated wife. Even
though" the payments are installments of insurance proceeds, they may
be taxed to the wife under a special provision of the law.8
In order to obtain the income tax advantage, the beneficiary's selec-
tion of the settlement option must be pursuant to the contractual obliga-
tions of the policy. If the insurance company voluntarily pays the bene-
ficiary something more than was required by the policy, such as divi-
dends, these payments are taxable income to the beneficiary. The
necessity for a legally enforceable right contained in the policy itself
is well illustrated in a case in which the government succeeded in tax-
ing a beneficiary with reference to policies placed with two separate
companies. 9 The proceeds were left with one of the companies, at in-
terest. The beneficiary, with the company's consent, changed the option
so as to require installment payments of principal and interest rather
than interest alone. The court commented that the exemption is to be
narrowly construed and that the alteration of the option was not pursu-
ant to any right given under the contract. There were policies with an-
other company in which the insured and not the beneficiary had the
power to select the option. Even though the company allowed the bene-
ficiary to exercise the option, the government's imposition of the tax
was sustained.
5 Bullard v. Comm., 5T.C.1346 (1945) ; Comm. v. Pierce, 146 F.(2d)388(C.C.A.
2nd 1944); Comm. v. Winslow, 113 F.(Zd)418(C.C.A. 1st, 1940).
6 I.R.C. 22 (b) (1) ; Regs. 111, Sec. 29.22 (b) (1)-i.
7U.S. v. Heilbroner, 22 F.Supp.368 (S.D., N.Y., 1938); aff'd 100 F.(2d) 379(C.C.A. 2nd, 1938).
sI.R.C. 22 (k) and 22 (b) (2) (A); Regs. 111, Sec. 29.22 (b) (2)-4.




There are important income tax considerations where policies are
assigned for value. Transfers for love and affection raise problems as
to gift taxes and, as will be discussed later, problems as to estate taxes;
but if the transfer is for consideration, the law does not extend the in-
come tax exclusion to the proceeds.10 The assignee must pay an income
tax upon the difference between the proceeds received and the total of
the premiums paid by the assignee plus the amount of the consideration
originally paid." Of course, if the consideration given is greater than
the ultimate amount of the proceeds, no income tax liability exists.'
There are several exceptions to the general rule of income tax lia-
bility upon assignments for value. If the insured himself is the bene-
ficiary-purchaser, no income tax liability will be incurred. 13 This ap-
plies even if the insured buys the policy from a prior transferee for
value. Thus, it can be said, generally, that if an insured acquires a
policy on his own life from another owner, or if he gives such policy
away, there will be no income tax liability in the absence of further
transfers.
Another exception to the usual rule that policies assigned for value
will result in income taxes relates to the situation wherein the basis
for gain or loss in the hands of the transferee is the same as that of
the transferor.14 Thus, a transfer in accordance with Section 112 (b)
(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, under which a partnership is
changed to a corporation in a tax-free transfer, would permit the trans-
feree of the policy to stand in the transferor's shoes. The same would
apply to a transfer by a subsidiary corporation to a parent corporation
on liquidation. Of course, if the transferor had acquired the policy for
value there could be income tax liability to the second transferee with-
out reference to the gain or loss nature of the second transfer.
The income tax aspects of a transferred policy are sufficiently
serious to warrant circumspection in assigning a policy for value. In the
Premium Products Co. case,' 5 the taxpayer's acquisition of a $100,000.00
policy proved to be an expensive transaction. The taxpayer paid out
$29,000.00 for the policy. Upon receipt of $100,000.00, at the insured's
death, $71,000.00 of it was treated as ordinary income and subject to
the current income tax rates for that year.
It frequently happens that it is not until after a policy has been
issued that the insured, his underwriter or his attorney discovers that
10 I.R.C. 22 (b) (2) (A) ; Regs. 111, Sec. 29.22 (b) (2)-3.
" Waters, Inc. v. Comm., 160F.(2d)596(C.C.A. 9th, 1947) ; St. Louis Ref rigerat-
ing & Cold Storage Co. v. U.S., 66 F.Supp. 62 (E.D., Mo., 1946); Blum v.
Higgins, 150F. (2d) 471 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1945).
12Lambeth v. Comm., 38 B.T.A. 351 (1938).
is Regs. 111, Sec. 2922 (b) (2)-3.
'4 I.RtC. 22 (b) (2) (A); Regs. 111, Sec. 29.22 (b) (2)-3.
15 Premium Products Co. v. Comm., 2 T.C. 445 (1943).
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the policy should have been owned by someone else. To effect an
assignment will leave the insured between the Scylla of income tax
liability (because of an assignment for value) and the Charybdis of
estate tax liability (because of a gratuitous transfer in contemplation
of death). Can the error be corrected with tax safety? If the error is
promptly discovered and the insured is still able to pass the medical
examination, it may be best to cancel the policy and have a new con-
tract applied for by the desired owner, with the premiums paid by such
owner. If that avenue is closed, and if the premiums were in fact paid
by the proper owner, and endorsement may be written in the policy by
the insurance company setting up the fact of the issuance in error and
amending the policy to show ownership in the correct person. This
course may evoke a contest by the government and should be taken only
after determining that the facts will establish that the endorsement does
no more than make the policy read as it was always intended it should.
The Commissioner will probably contend that the endorsement is in
fact a taxable assignment. Under no circumstances should there be an
attempt made to pretend that the first policy was never issued; if this
involves destruction of records or otherwise presenting a false picture
of the facts, it would seem that fraud penalties might follow.
The mere fact that a policy does not have a cash surrender value
at the time of its transfer will not deter the Treasury from asserting
that it was assigned for value. This is because a policy has economic
value other than its cash value, if it be no other than the right to con-
tinue the contract without further medical examination. The insured
will be in a better position if he has kept records showing that the trans-
fer was a gratuitous one. By hypothesis, the insured will be dead at the
time this question arises, and, accordingly, it is only through the pre-
sentation of letters or other memoranda that there can be a showing
made that the transfer of the policy was intended to be a gift as op-
posed to a transfer for value. In this connection caution must be ex-
erised to see that the assignment form used on a transfer, in which in-
come tax consequences are not intended, avoids the standard phrase
"for value received." If these words appear on the form.supplied by
the insurance company, it is important to strike them and supplant them
with a phrase such as "for love and affection."
The Wisconsin statute does not distinguish between assigned and
non-assigned policies" It exempts from income taxation all insurance
received in payment of a death claim. However, insurance paid to a
corporation or partnership upon policies upon the lives of officers,
partners or employees are subject to the Wisconsin income tax.
16 Wis. Stats. (1945) Sec. 71.05 (c).
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B. ESTATE TAXES ON INSURANCE PROCEEDS.
With the passage of the Revenue Act of 1948,17 it can be expected
that many policy holders will do well to reexamine their beneficiary ar-
rangements so as to gain the marital deduction afforded by the new
statute. However, there is a more fundamental question which each
estate owner must determine: is the policy part of his estate? Prior to
1942, the first $40,000.00 of insurance proceeds payable to named bene-
ficiaries were excluded for estate tax computations, but no such ex-
clusion is now authorized. Section 811 (g) of the Internal Revenue
Code provides that a decedent's gross estate will include the proceeds
of policies upon the life of the decedent
(1) If they are payable to the decedent's executor, or
(2) If the premiums were paid directly or indirectly by the dece-
dent, or,
(3) If the decedent at the time of his death possessed any of the
policy's incidents of ownership.
When is a premium paid "indirectly" by an insured? The regula-
tions give examples which indicate that the Treasury will use a broad
definition of the word.18 It should be anticipated that the government
will seek to include the proceeds where premiums are paid by an alter
ego corporation or one which the decedent controls; by a trust the in-
come of which is taxable to the insured; by an employer of the insured
in a manner which suggests a substitute for salary; and, finally, where
the decedent has transferred funds to the person paying the premiums.
In the last situation, a husband will frequently make a gift of money
to his wife and permit her to pay the premiums. It is unlikely that this
device will be fruitful regardless of the discretion employed in trans-
ferring the funds. It is usually an invitation to litigation to utilize this
method. Of course, if the wife has independent wealth, there is no
danger; and, if the wife had originally applied for the insurance on her
husband's life and paid the premiums, it is clear that the proceeds will
not be a part of his gross estate.
The test required under the statute relative to premium payments
is one of the rare instances in which life insurance is discriminated
against. The case has been well stated in a report to the House Ways
and Means Committee:
The law was amended in 1942 to provide that the proceeds of
an insurance policy on a decedent's life must be included in his
taxable estate, if he paid the premiums on the policy. This is
true, even though the decedent had given the policy away and
had no remaining interest in it whatever, yet (except for trans-
17 Revenue Act of 1948, 80th Cong., 2nd Session, April 2, 1948.
18 Regs. 105, Sec. 81.27 (a).
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fers in contemplation of death) no other property which the de-
cedent does not own is included in his gross estate. We see no
reason why insurance should thus be discriminated against. We
therefore recommend that these provisions (sec. 811 (g) (2)
(a) ) be eliminated so that insurance payable to an individual
beneficiary will only be included in the decedent's estate if he
possessed incidents of ownership of the policy.19
Where are the incidents of ownership, possession of which causes
the proceeds to be taxed in an insured's estate? Generally, the "inci-
dents" are the economic benefits of the policy. The statute expressly
eliminates reversionary interests.0 It is probable that possession of
any of the following rights or powers will render the proceeds includ-
ible .1
(1) The power to change the beneficiary.
(2) The power to surrender or cancel the policy.
(3) The power to assign it.
(4) The power to revoke an assignment.
(5) The power to pledge it for a loan.
(6) The power to obtain from the insurer a loan against the
surrender value of the policy.
For purposes of the Wisconsin inheritance tax law, the incidents of
ownership are defined by the statute.2 If the insured wishes to avoid
the inclusion of the proceeds of a policy in his gross estate, he must
make a comprehensive examination of the policy to be certain that he
has divested himself of all ownership rights. The contracts of the var-
ious companies differ in their designation of ownership rights; in fact,
policies of the same company have enough variations to command
scrutiny of each policy.
If a policy is transferred as a gift, the estate tax can be avoided
under certain limited circumstances. There will be a gift tax to pay2 3
but the more serious hazard is that the transfer will be considered to
be one in contemplation of death or one intended to take effect at death.
The principal question is the motive of the decedent.24
In Cronin v. Commissioner, a man, 53 years of age, active, in good
health, gave away a large amount of insurance five years before his
death. The Tax Court found that the transfer was made in contempla-
tion of death stating that the subject matter of the gift, insurance poli-
cies, were "inherently testamentary in character."2 5 The Circuit Court
19 Report of Special Tax Study Committee of Committees on Ways and Means
of House of Representatives, Nov. 1947, p. 30.
2OI.R.C. 811 (g) (2).
21 Regs. 105, Sec. 81.27 (a).
22 Wis. Stats. (1945) Sec. 72.01 (7) (a).
23 Supra. n. 17; Sec. 372 adds a marital deduction to I.R.C. 1004 (a).
2 Wells v. U.S., 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
25 7 T.C. 1403, 1410 (1946).
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reversed 6 on the ground that it was established that the insured was
in the course of an extremely uncertain business program and that this
critical condition was the motive for the transfer. However, the Circuit
Court expressly agreed with the Tax Court concerning the testamentary
character of insurance. In a report of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, the same concept relating to the testamentary character of insur-
ance was expressed:
Recognizing the testamentary nature of insurance on the life of
the decedent both where premiums are paid directly or indirectly
by him and where he possessed at the time of his death some in-
cident of ownership, your Committee proposes to include all pro-
ceeds of such insurance in the gross estate.2 7
The case of Slifka v. Johnson2 s further illustrates the dangers in
connection with gratuitous transfers of policies. The insured, while in
good health, at age 45, transferred certain policies. The government
claimed the gift was in contemplation of death, and that the primary
motive was to reduce the Federal estate tax thereon. It was shown that
the insured's underwriter addressed a communication to the insurance
company explaining that the transfer was "to avoid payment of taxes."
The court upheld the government's contention.
The Slifka case produces a clear caveat. The gratuitous transfer
will not produce an estate tax deduction unless an independent motive
can be shown which is not in contemplation of death. Such motive
might be the hazardous business enterprise of the Cronin case, or any
other strong motive definitely associated with life. For example, where
the policy was transferred to a wife in connection with a property
settlement on the occasion of the parties' divorce, the Tax Court held
the gift was not in contemplation of death.2 9
Where insurance is included in the decedent's estate, unless the will
provides otherwise, the tax will be so apportioned that the executor
can recover from the insurance beneficiary such portion of the total
tax paid as the proceeds of the policies bear to the sum of the net
estate.30 The Revenue Act of 1948 amends the Internal Revenue Code
so that the proceeds received by a spouse are liable only to the extent
that the proceeds exceed the marital deduction.3 ' The proceeds of Na-
tional Service Life Insurance policies are includible in a decedent's
estate, just as proceeds of other life insurance policies.2 Although the
26164 F. (2d) 561 (C.C.A. 6th, 1947).2 7 H.R. Report No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2nd Session, July 14, 1942, p. 52.
2663 F. Supp. 289 (S.D., N.Y., 1945); 161 F. (2d) 467 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1947);
cert. den. 68 S. Ct. 57 (1947).
29 Hurd v. Comm. 9 T.C. 681 (1947).
30 I.R.C. 826 (c).
31 Supra n. 17; Sec. 365.
32 Ltr. dtd. Oct. 21, 1943, signed by D. H. Bliss, Deputy Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
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executor cannot obtain contributions for estate tax from the proceeds
of National Service Life Insurance,3 and although the government
cannot levy upon such proceeds, the tax claim may be enforced against
other property belonging to the decedent's estate.34
The State of Wisconsin inheritance tax law provides for a $10,000.00
exemption as to insurance otherwise taxable, provided the insurance is
payable to beneficiaries other than the insured's estate.35
C. ESTATE TAXES AND THE 1948 REVENUE ACT.
The Revenue Act of 1948 has caused a terrific upheaval in estate
planning. One of the more important aspects of the new law relates
to the marital deduction under the Federal estate tax. The marital de-
duction can aggregate up to fifty per cent of the value of the adjusted
gross estate 0 and, accordingly, can bring about startling reductions in
estate taxes. A man who dies leaving an adjusted gross estate of
$120,000.00 formerly had to pay an estate tax of $9,500.00, which rep-
resents the applicable rates on that portion of his estate which is in
excess of the specific exemption of $60,000.00. Through optimum use
of the marital deduction, he can reduce his estate tax to zero provided
compliance is had with the conditions of the new statute.
Section 361 (e) (1) (G) of the 1948 Act adds the following mari-
tal deduction to Section 812 of the Internal Revenue Code in comput-
ing the net estate for tax purposes:
In the case of proceeds of insurance upon the life of the dece-
dent receivable in annual or more frequent installments com-
mencing within one year after the decedent's death, if under the
terms of the policy all amounts payable during the life of the
surviving spouse are payable only to such spouse, and if such
spouse has the power to appoint all amounts payable after such
spouse's death (exercisable in favor of the estate of such spouse,
whether or not the power is exercisable in favor of others)-
(i) such proceeds shall, for the purposes of subparagraph
(A), be considered as passing to the'surviving spouse, and
(ii) no part of such proceeds shall, for the purposes of sub-
paragraph (B) (i), be considered as passing to any person
other than the surviving spouse.
This subparagraph shall be applicable only if, under the terms
of the policy, such power in the surviving spouse to appoint,
whether exercisable by will or during life, is exercisable by such
spouse alone and in all events.
33Ltr. dtd. Apr. 29, 1946, signed by D. H. Bliss, Deputy Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.34 Ltr. dtd. Mar. 14, 1946, signed by D. H. Bliss, Deputy Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
s5 Wis. Stats. (1945) Sec. 72.01 (7) (b).
se Supra n. 17; Sec. 361 (e) (H).
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This section raises the problem as to the manner in which life in-
surance proceeds shall be made payable. Where the primary beneficiary
is the wife, it is submitted that the marital deduction may be lost if
there are named contingent beneficiaries. The naming of the contin-
gent beneficiaries may be construed to deprive the wife of the com-
pleteness of ownership which the statute contemplates. The apparent
intent of the new law is to permit the marital deduction only where
the proceeds pass to the surviving spouse in such a manner that the
proceeds will be subjected to a transfer tax in the estate of the sur-
viving spouse upon the latter's death.
It is apparent that a payment to the surviving spouse exclusively
will meet the requirements of the statute so as to authorize the marital
deduction. The naming of contingent beneficiaries, however, creates
the possibility, at least, that persons other than the surviving spouse
will be considered as having an interest in the proceeds. It is to be
expected that the Treasury's regulations will clarify this question, but
at this juncture it would appear to be the safer policy to name the wife
as the only beneficiary.
A lump sum payment to the wife, based upon her survival, should
be safe, regardless of the naming of contingent beneficiaries; but the
same cannot be said of periodic payments under a settlement option-
and it would be far safer to eliminate the contingent beneficiaries en-
tirely.
Some companies will permit a primary beneficiary, after the in-
sured's death, to choose a settlement option and to name the successor
beneficiaries. In such instances, the estate owner can eliminate the con-
tingent beneficiaries on the expectation that his widow will be able to
name their children as the successor beneficiaries after his death. The
insured thereby will gain the estate tax deduction and have reason to
expect that his children will receive a portion of the proceeds pursuant
to payments under the settlement options. The danger in this, how-
ever, is that the selection of the option and the appointment of succes-
sors may be permissible only in the event the insured does not designate
the option; this would mean a lump sum payment to the widow-and
a husband may properly be reluctant to leave a large amount of pro-
ceeds to his widow in the hope that she will be wise enough to leave it
with the insurer pursuant to a settlement option selected by her.
It is reasonably clear that the law does not intend to bar the marital
deduction merely because the payments under the policy are made to
the widow in installments. In the Senate Report accompanying the
bill, the following explanations are given:
The entire proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of the
decedent are payable to the surviving spouse and the value of
such proceeds is included in determining the value of the gross
[Vol. 32
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estate. A marital deduction is allowed with respect to the value
of the proceeds because no person other than the surviving
spouse has an interest in the proceeds. The result will be the
same whether such proceeds are payable in a lump sum; are pay-
able in installments to the surviving spouse, her heirs, or assigns,
for a term; or are payable to the surviving spouse for her life
with no refund of the undistributed proceeds or with such a re-
fund to her estate. It is also immaterial whether any such mode
of payment is determined by an option exercised by the decedent
or exercised by the surviving spouse.3 7
Subparagraph (G) of section 812 (e) (1), which was not
contained in the bill as passed by the House, also provides an
exception to the terminable interest provisions of subparagraph
(B) of section 812 (e) (1). The exception is for the purpose of
allowing the marital deductions in the case of proceeds of life
insurance upon the life of the decedent where the surviving
spouse is entitled to installments of the proceeds and has the
same type of power possessed by the surviving spouse in the
case of a trust to which subparagraph (F) applies. Subpara-
graph (G) applies only if the proceeds of the insurance are re-
ceivable in installments, commencing within 1 year after the
decedent's death. The amounts payable to the surviving spouse
must be installments which have the effect of reducing during
her lifetime the aggregate proceeds of the policy available for
future payments. 38
An unanswered question relates to the power of the primary bene-
ficiary to withdraw the proceeds. If there are contingent beneficiaries,
but the contract requires periodic payments to the widow who has the
unfettered power to withdraw any or all of the proceeds held by the
insurance company, is the marital deduction allowable? The answer,
in the writer's opinion, is in the affirmative; but there is sufficient un-
certainty at this time to recommend removal of the contingent bene-
ficiaries whenever possible. It would appear that an absolute right to
withdraw the proceeds should make the surviving spouse the owner of
the proceeds and be the equivalent of a general power of appointment.
A possible argument against this position is that the widow might
be limited as to the number, time and amount of withdrawals by the
insurance company, and, therefore, the power would not be exercisable
by her "alone and in all events." This position is unsound and the
right to withdraw should be a sufficiently outright transfer to the widow
so as to warrant the marital deduction, whether or not there are con-
tingent beneficiaries. The Senate Report includes a definition of a
3 Senate Finance Committee Report, No. 1013, dated Mar. 16, 1948, U.S. Code
Congressional Service, 1948, No. 3, p. 644.
38 Ibid, p. 650.
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power of appointment which is broad enough to include the power to
withdraw.3 9
The new statute on estate taxes works a considerable benefit to the
estate owner whose wife has only a small personal estate. In such case,
the husband can rearrange his beneficiary structure and accomplish a
substantial diminution of estate taxes on his death, without shifting
the ultimate burden to his wife's estate on her death. The man whose
wife is the owner of a large personal estate is in a different position.
He is faced with the alternative of foregoing the marital deduction or
increasing the estate tax on his wife's subsequent death. The trust
device and use of insurance options which would give the wife a life
interest are still available to him, but it does not give him the same
amount of ultimate tax saving which others may accomplish through
the marital deduction. There will be $60,000.00 exemption at the wife's
death, but there will also be increased state inheritance taxes as well
as greater probate charges.
Even if the wife has a large personal estate, a man whose concern
is for the financial security of his wife as opposed to that of his children
will nevertheless choose to take advantage of the marital deduction de-
spite the fact that a second estate tax at the time of the wife's death will
result in diminished proceeds for the children.
There is sufficient uncertainty as to the permanence of the marital
deduction feature of our new tax law to merit this caution. It is fre-
quently a grave error to alter a carefully composed estate plan solely
to accomplish a tax saving. The man who has a desire to provide ade-
quate support for his wife during her lifetime with the principal of his
estate passing thereafter to his children could have such plan ruined by
an outright transfer at death to his widow; the widow might dissipate
the money either through wild self-indulgence, innocent misguidance
or possible fleecing upon remarriage. Even though a will were executed
by the wife at the time the proceeds were made payable to her, there
would be uncertainty that she would leave her will unchanged after
her husband's death. The use of the trust device in the widow's will
can reduce to some extent the likelihood of such an unfortunate result,
but basically the estate owner must determine whether it is more im-
portant to him to protect his children or to accomplish an estate tax
saving.
D. RIGHTS OF CREDITORS.
While an insured lives and is the owner of a policy of insurance,
his creditors have the right to compel the application of his policies to
the satisfaction of their claims. Upon the insured's death, however, and
31 Ibid, p. 649. "A 'power to appoint' the corpus includes any power which in
substance and effect is such a power regardless of the nomenclature used in
creating the power and local property-law connotations."
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assuming that the policy is payable to someone other than his estate,
the proceeds are, by law, free from the claims of his creditors."0 This
constitutes a tremendously important advantage to the use of life in-
surance in assuring financial security for one's survivors. It is an
essential feature for the man who can anticipate large claims against
his estate at his death.
We have seen that by statute insurance proceeds will be reached by
estate taxes unless the decedent has taken steps to exempt them; but
an insured's creditors will ordinarily be able to reach the proceeds only
if the decedent has them payable to his estate or subjects the policies
to the creditors' control during his lifetime.41 The creditors of the
beneficiary, however, in the absence of a statutory bar or a spendthrift
clause, are permitted to reach the proceeds to the extent of the debtor-
beneficiary's interest in the proceeds.4
To the limited extent of $5,000.00, proceeds payable to a married
woman are exempt from creditors in Wisconsin.4 The problems relat-
ing to the determination of marital status were well brought out in
Luebke v. Vonnekold"4 where the insured named an unmarried woman
as beneficiary under a $500.00 policy. The same man later took out an
addftional policy payable to her in the sum of $1500.00; at the time that
the latter insurance was taken out the beneficiary was married, al-
though not to the insured. A creditor garnished the insurance company
for the full $2,000.00, but the court held that only $500.00 was subject
to garnishment since she was single at the time it was made payable
to her and was, therefore, not exempt. The court ruled that the status
of a married woman is determined at the time when the policy is taken
out and not when the proceeds become payable.
Insurance proceeds enjoy an additional protection in Wisconsin if
they are in the nature of a fraternal society benefits. $5,000.00 of such
insurance is exempt against the creditors of the insured or his bene-
ficiary where the insured pays the premiums, and all proceeds are ex-
empt "if some other person pays the premiums.1
45
E. CREDITORS AND SPENDTHRIFT PROVISIONS.
The mere use of the term "spendthrift" invokes unflattering con-
notations for a clause which can play an important role in protecting
insurance proceeds from creditors of the beneficiary. Lawyers have
long employed such clauses in both inter-vivos and testamentary trusts.
40 Wis. Stats. (1945), Sec. 272.18 (19) ; See, also, amendment in Ch. 137, Laws
of 1947, approved May 19, 1947.
41Oldenburg v. Central Life Assurance Society, 243 Wis. 8, 9 N.W. (2d) 133
(1943).
42 First Wisconsin Natl. Bank v. Strelitz, 209 Wis. 335, 245 N.W. 74 (1932).
43 Wis. Stats. (1945), Sec. 246.09.
44 250 Wis. 496, 27 N.W. (2d) 458 (1947).45 Wis. Stats. (1945), Sec. 272.18 (19).
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Despite vigorous attacks by creditors, such clauses have generally en-
joyed acceptance and enforcement by the courts. Designed in theory
to prevent a wastrel from an anticipatory dissipation of his wealth, the
spendthrift clause is now broad enough to protect the most thrifty and
pennypinching beneficiary from assigning or otherwise losing his rights
to protected assets. In trusts, this is accomplished by authorizing the
trustee to withhold payments of interest and principal in the event the
trustee suspects that creditors are hovering over a beneficiary's shoulder.
About three-fourths of the states have legislative expressions on the
subject of spendthrift clauses in policies of life insurance. Some of
the states provide that the protection is automatic and need not be set
forth in the policy. In many of these statutes, however, there are




In about twenty-five states the statutes merely authorize the insur-
ance contract to provide this protection. In Wisconsin, for example,
the legislature has gone no further than to pass an enabling statute.48
The courts have given support to the spendthrift clauses in insurance
contracts when efforts to penetrate them have been made by creditors. 49
While it is certain that the beneficiaries will be protected from creditors
where the insured has selected the option, certainty thins into doubt-
fulness where either of the following circumstances apply: (a) the
beneficiary has selected the settlement option, or (b) the settlement op-
tion gives the beneficiary the power to withdraw the principal on de-
posit with the insurance company.
Suppose that the policy authorizes the insured's widow to select the
insurance option and after his death she selects an installment option
and includes a spendthrift clause. Can her creditors reach the pro-
ceeds? Is there a distinction to be made between the case of a husband
establishing the protective clause for his wife and the case of the wife
setting up such a clause for herself ? The prospect of sustaining the val-
idity of the clause is far better where someone other than the debtor has
established the clause. Although there is authority for sustaining the
clause even in the case of the beneficiary's selection,5 ° it would seem
more prudent to have the insured insert the clause in the policy and
thereby circumvent disputes as to whether the beneficiary's selection is
enforceable.
46 See, for example, Tenn. Code, 1932, Sec. 6398, limiting protection to proceeds
paid by fraternal benefit society.
4 See, for example, Nevada Comp. Laws, Supp. (1941) Sec. 8844, limiting
protection to proceeds of policies with annual premiums of $500.00.
48 Wis. Stats. (1945), Sec. 206.39.49 Annis v. Pilkewitz, 287 Mich. 68, 282 N.W. 905 (1938); Crossman v. Rauch,
263 N.Y. 264, 188 N.E. 748 (1934).5 0Provident Trust Co. v. Rothman, 321 Pa. 177, 183 Atl. 793 (1940).
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TAXATION OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS
In an effort to accomplish some of the flexibility realized with the
trust device, it is quite common for settlement options to grant the
beneficiary the right to withdraw a portion or all of the proceeds on
deposit. Does this unqualified right of withdrawal remove the portion
subject to withdrawal from the protective wing of the spendthrift
clause? Although the New York Court of Appeals has answered this
question in the negative,51 it would appear to be the wiser policy for
the insured to decide which is more important to him: (a) that his
beneficiaries have the power to withdraw the principal on deposit or
(b) that they be sheltered from their creditors. It is recommended that
only the more vital of the two benefits be employed.
52 Genesee Valley Trust Co. v. Glazer, 295 N.Y. 219, 66 N.E. (2d) 169 (1946).
